Classification of Property by L\u27Enfant, Howard W., Jr.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 25 | Number 1
Symposium Issue: Louisiana Legislation of 1964
December 1964
Classification of Property
Howard W. L'Enfant Jr.
Louisiana State University Law Center
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Howard W. L'Enfant Jr., Classification of Property, 25 La. L. Rev. (1964)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol25/iss1/18
COMMENTS
country the power of renunciation first developed, but it is
known that both French and Spanish provisions for this power
existed at the time of redaction in 1808.131 Because of the great
similarity in language between the Louisiana and French ar-
ticles, however, it seems reasonable to assume that the French
constituted the source.
32
It can be seen, therefore, that Louisiana's community prop-
erty law is not of single origin. Spanish theories contributed
substantially, as manifested by Louisiana's classification of
property. The influence of over forty years of Spanish occupa-
tion on Louisiana custom cannot be overlooked, especially when
dealing with an institution that owes so much of its develop-
ment to customary law. Consequently when interpreting Lou-
isiana's community property provisions, one should be wary of
relying solely on French authorities. Spanish authorities and
commentators should also be considered to assure the most accu-
rate interpretation possible of Louisiana's community property
law.
Paul H. DuW
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
Every marriage contracted in Louisiana' creates a commu-
nity of acquets and gains unless the parties have expressly stipu-
lated otherwise by prenuptial contract.2 In this regime of com-
munity property all property brought into the marriage or
acquired by the spouses during the marriage is classified as
separate property or community property. 3 A thorough under-
standing of the legal principles governing this classification is
essential, as the legal status of the property affects the rights
of all persons concerned with it -the spouses themselves, their
the wife or her heirs and assigns have the faculty of accepting or renouncing it.
Any agreement to the contrary is null."
131. See note 130 supra.
132. Compare LA. CIVIL CODE p. 338, arts. 72-76, 78, 79, p. 340, arts. 80-84
(1808) ; corresponding to LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2379-2384, 2387-2392 (1825) and
LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2410-2415, 2418-2423 (1870) with FRENCH CIViL CODE
arts. 1453, 1454, 1456, 1460, 1461, 1463-1466, 1492, 1493.
1. The rule also applies to marriages contracted outside of the state when
the parties establish a domicile in Louisiana. Property acquired after their
arrival is governed by Louisiana law. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2401 (1870).
2. Id. arts. 2325, 2329, 2399.
3. Id. art. 2334.
1964]
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creditors, 4 their heirs, and anyone who deals with them concern-
ing the property. This Comment examines the origin and de-
velopment of the legal rules which govern classification of prop-
erty in, Louisiana.
HISTORICAL SOURCES
Although most of the Louisiana Civil Code is derived from
the Code Napoleon, the basic structure of our community prop-
erty system is derived from Spanish law.5 Spanish law viewed
marriage as a partnership in which the spouses devoted their
talents, energies, and resources to the common good.6 Thus it
followed that all acquisitions and gains attributable to such ex-
penditure of labor and resources should be shared by the part-
nership.7 This basic concept was the premise underlying classi-
fication of property in the Spanish community. Mode and time
of acquisition were important factors in application of the basic
principle.8 Thus property acquired before marriage remained
the separate property of the owner.9 Mode of acquisition con-
trolled the classification of property acquired during the mar-
riage. Generally all acquisitions by onerous title inured to the
partnership because the property was considered a product of
the common labor of the spouses."' Likewise, fruits" produced
from property, even separate property,12 inured to the partner-
4. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REv. 201 (1964).
5. See Morales v. Marigny, 14 La. Ann. 855 (1859) ; Cole's Widow v. Execu-
tors, 6 Mart.(N.S.) 41 (La. 1828) ; Frederic v. Frederic, 10 Mart.(O.S.) 188
(La. 1821) ; Bruneau v. Bruneau's Heirs, 9 Mart.(O.S.) 217 (La. 1821) ; Gale
v. Davis' Heirs, 4 Mart.(O.S.) 645 (La. 1817) ; Beauregard v. Piernas, 1
Mart. (O.S.) 281 (La. 1811); DAGGETT, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF
LOUISIANA 9 (1945) ; 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 1,
60 (1943) ; Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REv. 3
(1959) ; Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 78 (1964).
6. See MATIENZO, COMMENTARIA (1597), transl. in ROBBINS, COMMUNITY
PROPERTY LAWS 69 (1940) [hereinafter cited as MATIENZO with page reference
to ROBBINS transl.].
7. NoVISIMA RECOPILACISN bk. 10, tit. 4, L. 1 (1805) ; MATIENZO 69.
8. NOVISIMA RECOPILAI6N bk. 10, tit. 4, L. 1-6 (1805) MATIENZO 16-17,
23, 62, 69, 75, 113.
9. Novisim. RECOP]IACI6N bk. 10, titl. 4, L. 2, 5 (1805); MATIENZO 17, 69.
10. MATIENZO 17, 23, 35, 62, 97, 110, 113. The only exception to this rule
was an acquisition by exchange of separate property since the property was
obtained through the use of separate property and not through the joint labor
of the spouses. This principle was extended to cover situations in which sep-
arate property was sold and the funds used to purchase another piece of property.
The property acquired in this way was considered separate property because it
was considered a replacement for the land sold. MATIENZO 63.
11. AZ EVEDO, COMMENTARIORUM IURIS CIVILIS IN HISPANIAE REGTAS (1597),
transl. in ROBBINS, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAWS 154 (1940) [hereinafter cited
as AzEVEDO with page reference to ROBBINS transl.].
12. See NOVISIMA RECOPILACI6N bk. 10, tit. 4, L. 3, 5, 6 (1805); AZEVEDO
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ship because the labor of the spouses was employed in its pro-
duction.'3 However, if property was acquired during marriage
by gratuitous title (donation or inheritance), it was not con-
sidered the result of the labor of either spouse; hence it belonged
to the spouse acquiring it. 1 4 Acquisitions under gratuitous title
to the spouses jointly inured to the community because of the
obvious purpose of the transfer.35
COMPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY IN LOUISIANA
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 reproduced the three basic
features of the Spanish community of acquets and gains.'0 First,
all the property owned by either spouse prior to the marriage
remained the separate property of that spouse.' 7 Second, ac-
quisitions after marriage were classified as separate or com-
munity according to the time and mode of acquisition regard-
less of which spouse acquired the property.' 8 The application
of this rule produced the same results as achieved in the Spanish
system with respect to the classification of acquisitions under
onerous title (purchase or other similar way),19 under gratui-
tous title (succession or donation) to one of the spouses 20 and
under gratuitous title to both spouses.21 Third, the fruits of all
property, community and separate, inured to the community. 22
Louisiana followed this third provision with respect to the hus-
band's separate estate, 23 but made an exception for the fruits
of the wife's paraphernal property. 24 Under Spanish law the
husband had the right to administer the wife's paraphernal
property.2 5 Since he administered this property as the head
of the community, it followed that the fruits of his labor inured
to the community. 2 Louisiana codified the general rule in ar-
163, 167; GuTERREz, PRACTICORUM QUAESTIoNEm CIRCA LEGES REGIAs HISPANIA
(1606), transl. in RODBINS COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAWS 220 (1940) [hereinafter
cited as GUTiRERz with page reference to ROBBINS transl.]; MATIENZ0 17, 88.
13. AZEVEDO 150; GUTiERREZ 220; MATIENZo 35, 62, 113.
14. NOVISIMA RECOPILACION, bk. 10, tit. 4, L. 2 (1805) ; MATIEYZO 17, 75.
15. NOVISIMA RECOPILATION bk. 10, tit. 4, L. 2 (1805)
16. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2314, 2371 (1825), now LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2334,
2402 (1870). See note 5 supra.
17. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2314 (1825), now LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 ,1870).
18. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2371 (1825), now LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2402 (1870).
19. Ibid.
20. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2314 (1825), now LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870).
21. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2371 (1825), now LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2402 (1870).
22. See NOVISIMA RECOPILACION bk. 10, tit. 4, L. 3 (1805) ; MATIENZO 88.
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2371 (1825), now LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2402 (1870).
24. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2363 (1825), now LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2386 (1870).
25. AZEVEDO 163.
26. AzEVEDO 163.
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ticle 2371 which provided that "the profits of all the effects of
which the husband has the administration either of right or in
fact" belong to the community.2 7 But with respect to the wife's
separate estate the 1825 Code provided that if the wife admin-
istered her separate estate individually, the fruits inured to her
separate estate.2 8 By this rule Louisiana deviated from the basic
presumption of the Spanish community that the spouses always
devote their labors and talents to enhancement of the common
,,ood and not for individual gain. Though subscribing to the
basic principle in other areas, Louisiana permitted the wife to
channel some of her enegries toward advancement of her own
estate by diverting some of the produce of her industry from
the community.
Although the 1825 code articles substantially reproducing
the basic framework of the Spanish community were carried
forward into the 1870 Code, judicial interpretation and later
legislation introduced significant alterations. By providing that
if the wife administered her paraphernal property independ-
ently the fruits would inure to her separate estate, the Code
left the courts with the difficult problem of determining who in
fact was administering the wife's separate property. The dif-
ficulty was compounded by the rule that the wife could employ
the husband as her agent to administer her separate estate.29
Practically, the courts found the test of administration unwork-
able.80 Consequently, article 2386 was amended by Act No. 286
of 1944 to provide that unless the wife records a declaration
of her intent to reserve the fruits for her separate estate and
to administer the property separately and alone, the fruits will
inure to community.3 1 The courts have not yet determined
whether the fruits are separate or community if the wife files
27. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2371 (1825), now LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2402 (1870).
28. LA. CML CODE art. 2363 (1825), now LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2386 (1870).
29. See, e.g., Miller v. Handy, 33 La. Ann. 160 (1881).
30. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2385 (1870) provides that the paraphernal property
of the wife is considered to be under the control of her husband if she does not
administer it separately and alone. The presumption is in favor of administration
by the husband and the burden of proof is on those asserting otherwise. Houghton
v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933); Fortier v. Barry, 111 La. 776, 35
So. 900 (1904) ; Breaux v. LeBlanc, 16 La. Ann. 145 (1861). Nevertheless, the
courts were faced with the problem of determining what constituted administra-
tion. See Paul v. Arnoult, 164 La. 841, 114 So. 706 (1927) ; Miller v. Handy,
33 La. Ann. 160 (1881) ; see Note, 7 LA. L. REV. 588 (1947).
31. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2386 (1870) ; Trorlicht v. Collector, 25 So. 2d 547
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946). In discussing the 1944 amendment to article 2386
the court stated: "It seems to us to evidence nothing more than a realization
by the legislators of the fact that there may often be doubt as to how and by
whom a wife's separate estate is administered." 25 So. 2d at 551.
[Vol. XXV
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the declaration required by article 2386 but the husband in fact
administers the paraphernalia. It can be strongly argued that,
the legislative intent of the amendment is to relieve the courts
of determining by whom the property is administered. Once the
declaration has been filed, the fruits always inure to the wife's
separate estate. An authoritative decision by the courts is needed
to settle the question.
The code provisions concerning acquisitions under onerous
title likewise have been modified by the jurisprudence. The
courts have properly interpreted the provision of article 2402
relating to acquisition of property during marriage "by pur-
chase, or in any similar way" to include not only acquisitions
by purchase but also by dation en paiement,32 retrocession,3 3
acquisitive prescription,3 4 and exchanges 5 if the property given
in exchange is community property. The jurisprudence has made
an important alteration in the rule that all acquisitions under
onerous title are community property. Very early the courts
developed the principle of reinvestment,3 perhaps influenced
by French law,3 7 by which property could be acquired under
onerous title during the marriage to inure to the separate estate
of either spouse. This jurisprudential rule was given legislative
recognition by a 1912 amendment to article 2334 providing that
32. Slaton v. King, 214 La. 89, 36 So. 2d 648 (1948).
33. Bagala v. Bagala, 237 La. 60, 110 So. 2d 526 (1959); Betz v. Riviere,
211 La. 43, 29 So. 2d 465 (1947) ; Maddox v. Butchee, 203 La. 299, 14 So. 2d 4
(1943) ; Fulton v. Fulton, 7 Rob. 73 (Ia. 1844).
34. Crouch v. Richardson, 158 La. 822, 104 So. 728 (1925).
35. Slaton v. King, 214 La. 89, 36 So. 2d 648 (1948); Succession of Land,
212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947) ; Kittredge v. Grau, 158 La. 154, 103 So. 723
(1925); Dillon v. Freville, 129 La. 1005, 57 So. 316 (1912). In Dillon com-
munity funds were given along with the immovable of the separate estate and
the court held the property acquired was separate property because the chief
consideration for the exchange was the immovable from the separate estate. Cf.
Merren v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1931) ; Newson v. Adams, 3 La.
231 (1832). Note that status of the chief consideration given determines the
status of the property received.
36. See Sharp v. Zeller. 110 La. 61, 34 So. 129 (1902); Jordy v. Muir, 51
La. Ann. 55, 25 So. 550 (1898) ; Cockburn v. Wilson, 20 La. Ann. 40 (1868) ;
Hanna v. Pritchard, 6 La. Ann. 730 (1.851) ; Young v. Young, 5 La. Ann. 611:
(1850) ; Stroud v. Humble, 2 La. Ann. 930 (1847) ; Gonor v. Gonor, 11 Rob.
526 ([.a. 1845) ; Dominguez v. Lee, 17 La. 295 (1841). See also text accom-
panying note 46 infra.
37. FlR'ENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 1434, 1435 (Cachard's transl. 1930) ; cf. Sharp
v. Zeller, 110 La. 61, 71, 34 So. 129, 133 (1902) : "It has been held in France:
That in order that property purchased by the husband during marriage should
become his separate property, he should, in ,the act of purchase, make the double
declaration, first, that it is bought with the proceeds of a sale of property belong-.
ing to himself individually; second, that the purchase is made for the purpose. of
replacing the property sold. That the making use of only one of these declara-'-
tions is insufficient. Dalloz v. Verge, Code Annot~s. article 1434."
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the separate estate includes acquisitions during marriage with
separate funds.38 The principle of reinvestment, as applied by
the courts, converts the rule that all acquisitions under onerous
title are community property into a rebuttable presumption.8 9
Nevertheless the presumption is a difficult one to overcome,
and failure to do so results in classification of the acquisition
as community property.
COMPOSITION OF THE WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE
In the Spanish community, the wife's separate estate com-
prised initially the property she owned before marriage.
40 It
could be augmented during marriage by inheritance, by dona-
tions to her individually,41 and by increases in value resulting
from external events other than the labor of the spouses.
42
Louisiana adopted these rules in the 1825 Code 4 3 but modern
legislation and the jurisprudence have made several changes
favorable to the wife's separate estate. Under article 2363 (now
article 2386) the wife could retain the fruits from her para-
phernal property for her separate estate by administering her
property independently of her husband. 44 This method of aug-
menting her separate estate was impossible in Spanish law since
the wife could not remove the property from her husband's
administration. 4
5
The most significant alteration has occurred through de-
velopment of the principle of reinvestment. The courts have
reasoned that if the Code allowed the wife to reserve the fruits
of her paraphernalia for her separate estate, she should also be
able to reinvest these fruits to enhance her separate property.
Reinvestment is not limited to funds derived from fruits. If the
wife sells separate property, she can reinvest the proceeds; like-
38. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1912,
No. 170.
39. See Prince v. Hopson. 230 La. 575, 89 So. 2d 128 (1956) ; Smith v. Smith,
230 La. 509, 89 So. 2d 55 (1956); Succession of Hemenway, 228 La. 572, 83
So. 2d 377 (1956) ; Succession of LeJeune, 221 La. 437, 59 So. 2d 446 (1952) ;
Salassi, v. Salassi, 220 La. 785, 57 So. 2d 684 (1952) ; Succession of Land, 212
La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947).
40. MATIENZO 69.
41. NovISIMA RECOPILACI6N bk. 10, tit. 4, L. 2 (1805) ; MATIENZO 17.
42. MATIENZO 60.
43. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 231.4 (1825), now LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870).
44. Id. art. 2363, now LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2386 (1870). In 1944 this article
was amended so that now, if the wife wishes to keep these fruits for her separate
estate, she must file a declaration with certain requirements. See note 31 8supra,
and accompanying text.
45. AZEVEDO 163.
[Vol. XXV
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wise, she can reinvest funds acquired by inheritance or dona-
tion, or funds she acquired before marriage. Thus the juris-
prudential rule was created that under the theory of reinvest-
ment the wife can use separate funds to acquire property by
onerous title during the marriage for her separate estate.4"
The courts limited the availability of this mode of augment-
ing the wife's separate estate by requiring strict proof that the
acquisition under onerous title is indeed a reinvestment. Since
the presumption that all such acquisitions are community prop-
erty4 7 can be rebutted only by proof of reinvestment, it follows
that the wife must prove she made the acquisition with her sep-
arate funds for the benefit of her separate estate.48  There can
be no reinvestment unless the wife has separate funds to- re-
invest, and there is no reinvestment unless she intends the
acquisition to be such. As an added element of proof, the wife
is required to show that she is the sole administrator of the
funds, in order to reduce the possibility that these funds have
been allocated to the community. 49 If the purchase is a credit
transaction the wife must show that she has sufficient separate
funds to make it reasonable for her to expect to be able to meet
the deferred payments.," No special formalities are required
with respect to the instrument of transfer itself; since the
46. See Jordy v. Muir, 51 La. Ann. 55, 25 So. 550 (1898) ; Cockburn v.
Wilson, 20 La. Ann. 40 (1868) ; Hanna v. Pritchard, 6 La. Ann. 730 (1851) ;
Young v. Young, 5 La. Ann. 611 (1850) ; Stroud v. Humble, 2 La. Ann. 930
(1847); Gonor v. Gonor, 11 Rob. 526 (La. 1845); Dominguez v. Lee, 17 La.
295 (1841).
47. See note 39 supra.
48. Southwest Natural Prod. Co. v. Anderson, 239 La. 490, 118 So. 2d 897
(1960) ; Succession of Schnitter, 220 La. 323, 56 So. 2d 563 (1952) ; Cameron v.
Rowland, 215 La. 177, 40 So. 2d 1 (1949) ; Ortego v. Morein, 212 La. 774, 33
So. 2d 516 (1948) ; Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947) ; Betz
v. Itiviere, 211 La. 43, 29 So. 2d 465 (1947) ; Capillon v. Chambliss, 211 La.
1, 29 So. 2d 171 (1947) ; Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933);
Fortier v. Barry, 111 La. 776, 35 So. 900 (1904) ; Succession of Burke, 107 La.
82, 31 So. 391 (1902); Jordy v. Muir, 51 La. Ann. 55, 25 So. 550 (1898);
Succession of Rogge, 50 La. Ann. 1220, 23 So. 933 (1898) ; Stauffer, Macready
& Co. v. Morgan, 39 La. Ann. 632, 2 So. 98 (1887) ; Miller v. Handy, 33 La.
Ann. 160 (1881).
49. See note 48 supra. Arguably the 1944 amendment to article 2386 affected
the method of proving that the funds invested were her separate funds. Proof
that the wife was sole administrator of the funds invested seems required to show
her intent to reinvest for the benefit of her separate estate, rather than to show
the separate ownership of the funds invested. Thus the amendment to article
2386 seems not to have altered the requirement stated in text. The courts still
require proof of separate administration. See, e.g., Southwest Natural Prod. Co.
v. Anderson, 239 La. 490, 118 So. 2d 897 (1960).
50. See Succession of Franek, 224 La. 747, 70 So. 2d 670 (1954); Betz v.
Riviere, 211 La. 43, 29 So. 2d 465 (1947) ; Succession of Andrus, 131 La. 940,
60 So. 623 (1913) ; Fortier v. Barry, 111 La. 776, 35 So. 900 (1904) ; Miller
v. Handy, 33 La. Ann. 160 (1881) ; Metcalf v. Clark, 8 La. Ann. 286 (1853).
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property is purchased in the name of the wife, the instrument
is notice to the world that the property may be her separate
property.51
Problems arise if property is acquired by the wife in a credit
transaction and both separate and community funds are used
to pay the purchase price. The courts have concluded that if
any community funds are used, the wife cannot claim that the
purchase is a reinvestment of her separate funds and thus she
cannot rebut the presumption that the acquisition is community
property. 2 The rule has been followed even in cases in which
the separate estate of the wife contributed most of the pur-
chase price and the community advanced only a relatively small
amount. 53 Apparently, the courts have reasoned that the prin-
ciple of reinvestment is an exception to the rule that all acquisi-
tions under onerous title inure to the community and should
therefore be strictly construed. Although it may seem an un-
fair policy in some instances, in view of the principle that the
spouses are presumed to work primarily for the common good,
it is the sounder approach, and it is more in harmony with the
Louisiana community property system.5
51. Thus the wife need not make the double declarations which the husband
must make in the deed. See Prince v. Hopson, 230 La. 575, 89 So. 2d 128 (1956) ;
Smith v. Smith, 230 La. 509, 89 So. 2d 55 (1956); Cameron v. Rowland, 215
La. 177, 40 So. 2d 1 (1949) ; Betz v. Riviere, 211 La. 43, 29 So. 2d 465 (1947) ;
Capillon v. Chambliss, 211 La. 1, 29 So. 2d 171 (1947) ; Rousseau v. Rousseau,
209 La. 428, 24 So. 2d 676 (1946) ; Succession of Farley, 205 La. 972, 18 So. 2d
586 (1944) ; Otis v. Texas Co., 153 La. 384, 96 So. 1 (1923).
52. See Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1.933) ; Reine v. Reine,
170 La. 839, 129 So. 364 (1930) ; Succession of Coste, 43 La. Ann. 144, 9 So.
62 (1891) ; DeSentmnnat v. SoulM, 33 La. Ann. 609 (1881).
53. See Succession of Scbnitter, 220 La. 323, 56 So. 2d 563 (1952), where
the separate estate contributed $2,500 and the community $300 of the purchase
price. The court ruled that the property belonged to the community, which owed
the separate estate for its contribution.
54. There is the possibility that a husband could thwart his wife's attempted
purchases for her separate estate by making some of the deferred payments with
community funds. This problem was discussed in Bailey v. Alice C. Plantation,
152 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963), where it was indicated that the wife
must either knowingly use community funds to pay the price, or the husband
must make use of community funds with her consent to pay the price, in order
to prevent the wife from proving that the acquisition is separate property.
It seems that should the husband's action without her consent prevent the
wife from proving separate ownership (if such is possible after Bailey), she
should be permitted to sue for fraud. Dicta in Bailey indicated that the property
could be "converted" from separate to community through the use of community
funds after separate funds had been used initially. This theory does not appear
to be the most accurate appraisal of the legal concepts involved. It appears more
accurate to say that the use of community funds prevents the spouse from over-
coming the presumption in favor of the community because of one of the require-
ments, proof that only separate funds had been invested, can not be satisfied.
Acquisitions during the marriage are presumed to be community property until
rebutted by the required proof. See Note, 24 LA. L. RaV. 648 (1964).
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Estoppel by deed plays a significant role in the acquisition
of separate property under onerous title by the wife. The courts
hold that if the husband signs a deed, either as a party or as
witness, which recites that the acquisition is for the separate
estate of the wife and is made with her separate funds, he is
estopped from denying these recitals.55 , Estoppel also has been
applied when the husband did not sign the deed but signed two
subsequent notarial acts acknowledging that the purchase by
the wife was with her separate funds under her control and for
her separate estate.' 6 However, a husband who arranged for
the purchase but did not sign the deed and who subsequently
treated the property as a community asset by executing mineral
leases jointly with the wife was not estopped from denying her
assertions of separate ownership.57 The estoppel does not bind
the husband's forced heirs, 8s or creditors. 59
Allowing the wife to acquire property by precluding the hus-
band from denying her assertions of ownership seems incon-
sistent with basic principles of Louisiana community property
law. By the general rule all property acquired under onerous
title during the marriage is presumed to be acquired for the
community,60 and proof of reinvestment of separate funds is
the only mode of rebutting the presumption.61 Estoppel is con-
trary to these principles, for it allows the wife to acquire prop-
55. See Monk v. Monk, 243 La. 429, 144 So. 2d 384 (1962); Rousseau v.
Rousseau, 209 La. 428, 24 So. 2d 676 (1946) ; Pfister v. Casso, 161 La. 940, 109
So. 770 (1926) ; Tonglet v. Chopin, 155 La. 752, 99 So. 587 (1924) ; Succession
of Manning, 150 La. 1008, 91 So. 435 (1922) ; Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Hava, 140
La. 638, 73 So. 708 (1917) ; Karcher v. Karcher, 138 La. 288, 70 So. 228 (1915) ;
Kenner v. Leon Godchaux Co., 52 La. Ann. 965, 27 So. 542 (1900) ; Lavedan v.
Jenkins, 47 La. Ann. 725, 17 So. 256 (1895); Succession of Bellande, 42 La.
Ann. 241, 7 So. 535 (1890) ; Maguire v. Maguire, 40 La. Ann. 579, 4 So. 492
(1888); Moore v. Stancel, 36 La. Ann. 819 (1884); Kerwin v. Hibernia Ins.
Co., 35 La. Ann. 33 (1883) ; Succession of Wade, 21 La. Ann. 343 (1869).
56. Airhart v. Airhart, 153 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
57. Monk v. Monk, 243 La. 429, 144 So. 2d 384 (1962).
58. See Cameron v. Rowland, 215 La. 177, 40 So. 2d 1 (1949) ; Houghton v.
Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933) ; Phelps v. Mulhaupt, 146 La. 1078, 84 So.
362 (1920) ; Westmore v. Harz, 111 La. 305, 35 So. 578 (1.902) ; Succession of
Valdez, 44 So. 2d 151 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950) ; Lotz v. Citizens Bank & Trust
Co., 17 So. 2d 463 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1944) ; Drewett v. Carnahan, 183 So. 103
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
59. Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933) ;Pfister v. Casso, 161
La. 940, 109 So. 770 (1926); Kerwin v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 35 La. Ann. 33
(1883) ; DeSentmanat v. SoulN, 33 La. Ann. 609 (1881) Shaw v. Hill, 20 La.
Ann. 531 (1868); Huntington v. Legros, 18 La. Ann. 126 (1866); Willis v.
Gordon, 94 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) ; Succession of Valdez, 44 So. 2d
151 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950).
60. See note 39 aupra; LA. CIViL CODE art. 2402 (1870).
61. See note 46 supra.
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erty for her separate estate in some instances without proving
that the acquisition is a reinvestment of separate funds.
A further change in the basic framework inherited from
Spanish law is reflected in a 1912 amendment to article 2334
which provides that "the earnings of the wife when living sep-
arate and apart from her husband although not separated by
judgment of court, her earnings when carrying on a business,
trade, occupation or industry separate from her husband . . .
are her separate property. '62 As interpreted by the courts, the
amendment means that the earnings of the wife from her sep-
arate business or trade are her separate property only if she
is living apart from her husband although not separated by
judgment of court.6 3 Although it is clear when the wife's earn-
ings inure to her separate estate, it is not clear what constitutes
"earnings." The courts are faced with the problem of deter-
mining what income represents 'fruits," which would inure to
the Separate estate only if the proper declaration of parapher-
nality is filed, 64 and what income represents "earnings," which
would inure to the separate estate without any declaration if
the spouses are living separate and apart.6 5 It has been sug-
gested that the courts could use the ratio of labor to capital as
a criterion for classifying income in a particular case. 66 Thus
if the revenue received was the result of substantial capital
investment with relatively little labor, it would be a fruit gov-
erned by article 2386; but if the revenue represents the return
on substantial labor with relatively little capital investment, it
would be earnings governed by article 2334.67
Under Spanish law the wife could claim an increase in the
value of her property only if it were the result of the natural
course of events.6 8 Any increase in value of the separate prop-
62. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870).
63. See, e.g., Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
64. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2386 (1870).
65. Id. art. 2334; Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
66. See Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REV. 3
(1959).
67. The language of articles 2334 and 2386 bears out this approach. In speak-
ing of fruits article 2386 uses the terms "civil [fruits] including interest, divi-
dends and rents" which seem to apply primarily to investments of capital. When
speaking of earnings, article 2334 uses the terms "business, trade, occupation or
industry," which indicate primary emphasis on labor, though of course business
or trades require capital investments, at least initially.
In solving these problems the courts are forced to rely on their own practical
wisdom aided by the connotations of the terms used in the Code and suggested
approaches such as enumerated in the text.
68. GUrTIERREz 212; MAIENZO 60.
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erty produced by labor of the spouses would inure to the com-
munity since all their energies and industry were presumed
to be for the common good.6 9 Louisiana, by using the principle
of accession in relation to immovables, altered this concept so
that all improvements constructed on the separate estate belong
to the owner of the estate.7 0 If community funds have been em-
ployed, the owner of the separate estate owes the other spouse
half the amount of enhanced value. 71 If there be no increase
in value, or if it be attributable to causes other than the labor
of the spouses, the owner of the separate estate owes no obliga-
tion of reimbursement.7 2 Thus Louisiana law provides the wife
with an additional opportunity to augment her separate estate,
which was not possible in Spanish law.
A final change made in the basic structure inherited from
Spanish law resulted from amendments to articles 2334 and
2402, which enable the wife to retain damages collected for
offenses and quasi offenses as her separate property.7 3 The
provision seems a logical consequence of the greater legal free-
dom granted the wife to exercise and defend her rights.
COMPOSITION OF THE HUSBAND'S SEPARATE ESTATE
In the Spanish community the separate estate of the hus-
band consisted initially of all property acquired before mar-
riage.7 4 His separate estate could be augmented during marriage
by donations to the husband individually, 75 or by inheritance,
76
and by increases in value of separate property due to the natural
course of events. 77
69. AZEVEDo 150; GUTIERREZ 212; MATIENZO 35, 113.
70. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 508 (1870). However, instead of giving the own-
er of the separate estate a choice whether to keep the improvement and pay the
enhanced value or compel its removal as provided in article 508, the owner of the
separate estate is always compelled to pay the other spouse one-half the enhanced
value of the soil. These principles are applicable to the use of separate funds
to improve the community. See notes 70-72 infra, and accompanying text; Dillon
v. Freville, 129 La. 1005, 57 So. 316 (1912).
71. See Peters v. Klein, 161 La. 664, 109 So. 349 (1926) ; Succession of
Burke, 107 La. 82, 31 So. 391 (1902) ; Sims v. Bellington, 50 La. Ann. 968, 24
So. 637 (1898) ; Succession of Webre, 49 La. Ann. 1491, 22 So. 390 (1897)
Dillon v. Dillon, 35 La. Ann. 92 (1883).
72. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2408 (1870) ; Succession of Meteye, 113 La. 1012,
37 So. 909 (1905).
73. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2334, 2402 (1870).
74. MATIENZO 17, 69.
75. NOVISIMA REcOPILACI6N bk. 10, tit. 4, L. 2 (1805) ; MATIENZO 17, 75.
76. See note 75 supra.
77. GUTIERIREZ 212; MATIENzo 60.
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These provisions were incorporated into the Louisiana laws
governing the community.78 But there were changes. The courts
reasoned that if the wife can reinvest separate funds to aug-
ment her separate estate, the husband should have the same
privilege. 79  Thus the husband can acquire property under
onerous title during marriage for his separate estate, but his
burden of proving reinvestment is different from that of the
wife. Since property acquired in the husband's name may be
an acquisition by the head and master for the community or one
by the husband for his own estate, the courts require a declara-
tion in the instrument of transfer that the purchase was for
the husband's separate estate, if he intended it to be such.80
The requirement is probably motivated by a desire to make
titles as certain and free from ambiguity as possible in order
to protect creditors and purchasers and to prevent an un-
scrupulous husband from transferring unprofitable investments
to the community. Since the transaction must be reinvestment
of separate funds to be a permissible acquisition for the sep-
arate estate, the husband must prove he used separate funds to
make the acquisition. For reasons not altogether clear, the
courts also require that the husband declare in the deed that he
is using separate funds.8 ' By way of exception, the double
declaration is not required if the husband exchanges separate
property.8 2 The exception is explained perhaps by the court's
conclusion that the title of the separate property exchanged was
sufficient notice that the acquisition was for the separate estate.
Another reason might be that an exchange is more a replacement
of the property given than a reinvestment in which property of
a different type is acquired.
78. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2314 (1825), now LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870).
79. See, e.g., Young v. Young, 5 La. Ann. 611 (1850).
80. See Smith v. Smith, 230 La. 509, 89 So. 2d 55 (1956); Succession of
Chapman, 225 La. 641, 73 So. 2d 789 (1954); Lewis v. Clay, 221 La. 663, 60
So. 2d 78 (1952) ; Slaton A. King, 214 La. 89, 36 So. 2d 648 (1948) ; Fleming
v. Fleming, 211 La. 860, 30 So. 2d 860 (1947) ; Succession of Bell, 194 La. 274,
1.M So. 645 (1940) ; Peters v. Klein, 161 La. 664, 109 So. 349 (1926) ; Succes-
sion of Andrus, 131 La. 940, 60 So. 623 (1913) ; Sharp v. Zeller, 110 La. 61,
34 So. 129 (1902) ; Hero v. Bloch, 44 La. Ann. 1032, 11 So. 821 (1892). See
note 37 supra, and accompanying text.
The rule stated in the text applies to immovables; it has not as yet been
extended to movables. See Bruyninckx v. Woodward, 217 La. 736, 47 So. 2d 478
(1950).
81. See notes 37 and 80 8upra.
82. See Merren v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1931) ; Slaton v. King,
214 La. 89, 36 So. 2d 648 (1948) ; Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d
609 (1947) ; Kittridge v. Grau, 158 La. 154, 103 So. 723 (1925); Dillon v.
Freville, 129 La. 1005, 57 So. 316 (1912) ; Newson v. Adams, 3 La. 231 (1832).
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As in the case of the wife, the husband is able to claim, under
the principle of accession, improvements constructed on his
property as his separate property. 3 If these improvements are
made with community funds, the husband is obliged to reim-
burse the wife half the amount of the enhanced value.8 4
Under the 1920 amendment to article 2334 the husband may
reserve actions for damages for offenses and quasi offenses for
his separate estate, if he is living separate and apart from his
wife by reason of fault on her part sufficient to enable him to
obtain a judicial separation or divorce.85
The husband, unlike the wife, cannot divert the fruits of his
separate property or his earnings to his separate estate when
he lives voluntarily apart from his wife.8 0 The basis for this
distinction seems to be the traditional concept of the husband
as the chief provider and dominant financial partner; and to
enable him to meet his responsibilities in this capacity, the
courts have refused to allow him to divert this income from the
community.
CONCLUSION
The Louisiana community of acquets and gains rests on a
workable harmony of two principles. The first, inherited from
the Spanish community, declares that after marriage the labors,
energies, industry, and resources of both spouses, either jointly
or individually, are devoted to the common good. Though this
principle underlies the whole of the Louisiana community, it
is sharply modified by the concept of reinvestment, probably
acquired from the French Civil Code, which allows either spouse
to channel some of his energy and resources into enhancement
of his own estate. This provision has given Louisiana's com-
munity property structure the flexibility it needs to meet the
realities of family life in the mobile society of the present day.
The application of these laws, and the proposal of any changes,
should be made with care so as to preserve the balance that has
been achieved.
Howard W. L'Enfant, Jr.
83. See notes 70, 71, 72 supra, and accompanying text.
84. See note 71 supra, and accompanying text.
85. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870).
86. Id. art. 2402.
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